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NOTES
IMPEACHMENT WITH AN UNSWORN PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT AS SUBTERFUGE
Picture this: FBI agents investigating a bank robbery follow the
trail of the getaway car to an apartment building, where they ques-
tion the residents. One resident, Mrs. Wilson, says that she saw the
car pull up to the building on the day in question and then ob-
served the driver carry a gun and several bundles into the building.
"It was Mr. Davis, the man who lives in the next building. I saw
him with a gun, and lots of money." The agents quickly apprehend
Mr. Davis.
Meanwhile, other agents have arrested a suspected accomplice,
Mr. Williams. Security guards observed him loitering near the
bank for an extended period just before the robbery, and the
agents apprehended him shortly thereafter, as he walked quickly
away from the scene. As the agents question him, he indicates his
willingness to testify against Davis and says, "I told Davis this
morning it was too dangerous; I told him we'd never get away with
it." Williams is indicted for bank robbery but is being tried sepa-
rately. The prosecutor expects Williams to be a prime government
witness in Davis's trial.
Before his trial, however, Williams recants his prior statement
and now claims that he did not even see Davis the day of the rob-
bery. He confirms to the prosecutors that he will not implicate Da-
vis in Davis's trial. Meanwhile, Mrs. Wilson also experiences a
change of heart. The sight of her neighbor, Mr. Davis, being hauled
off in handcuffs has caused her to reflect upon what she saw that
day. She no longer thinks she saw Davis carrying a gun into the
building. In fact, she is not really sure exactly what she saw on the
day of the robbery. She tells the United States Attorney that she
will not stick to her original story if she is called to the witness
stand.
Several months later, Davis is on trial. He does not plan to call
either Mrs. Wilson or Mr. Williams; their testimony that they did
not see him on the day of the robbery is barely relevant at best.
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The prosecutor, however, calls them both. He asks Mrs. Wilson,
"Did you see the defendant carry a gun and money into his build-
ing on the day of the robbery?" He asks Mr. Williams, "On the day
you were arrested, did you tell Davis 'We'd never get away with
it?'" Both witnesses testify exactly as they have told everyone
they would: "No, I did not."
THE PROBLEM
Before the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the
prosecutor probably would have had to accept the witnesses' testi-
mony, because the common law "voucher" rule prevented a party
from impeaching his own witness.1 Under Federal Rule 607, how-
ever, a party may impeach his own witness.2 The next step for the
1. The ancient rule against impeaching one's own witness is of murky origin. Dean Wig-
more traced the rule to the rite of "compurgation," in which a trial was little more than a
swearing contest between the best "witnesses" each side chose to put on. One's witnesses
were "oath-helpers" who were supposed to guarantee the truth of the party's claim. Under
those circumstances, attacking the credibility of one's own oath-helper was patently illogi-
cal. Thus, the party was said to vouch for the credibility of those he called to support his
story. Wigmore noted that "[tihis traditional notion of a witness, that of a person 'ex officio'
a partisan pure and simple, persisted as a tradition long past the time when their function
had ceased to be that of a mere oath-taker and had become that of a testifier to facts." 3A J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 896, at 659 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). He
described the common law voucher rule as a "natural consequence" of the rite of compurga-
tion. Id.
On the other hand, Dean Ladd wrote that the voucher rule probably did not originate
with compurgation but instead arose because of the transition from an "inquisitorial"
method of trial to an adversarial system. Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New
Developments, 4 U. CHL L. REV. 69, 70 (1936). In the inquisitorial system, in which jurors
decided the case based on their own personal knowledge, the opportunity to question one's
own witness never arose. As a result, compurgation could have influenced the development
of the voucher rule only indirectly. Id. As Ladd points out, "Until there were witnesses in
the modern sense, there could be no reason for the idea that a party was bound by his
witness or that he could not impeach him." Id. at 72.
Ladd traced the rule to the changeover from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial one,
in which parties offer witnesses against each other: "As the change from the inquisitorial to
the adversary system came in criminal cases, we first find the courts declaring that the ac-
cused cannot impeach his own witnesses." Id. He noted that "[t]he tendency in this country
generally has been to accept the rule," Id. at 75, but he criticized the courts for accepting
the rule on its ancient foundations rather than "searching and testing its merits as a practi-
cal device." Id. at 76.
2. FED. R. EVID. 607. The rule provides that "[t]he credibility of a witness may be at-
tacked by any party, including the party calling him." See also FED. R. EVID. 607 advisory
committee note:
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prosecutor is obvious: he calls the FBI agents to whoih the two
witnesses made their previous statements and impeaches the wit-
nesses' testimony with their prior inconsistent statements.3 The so-
lution is simple.
Or is it? The federal courts traditionally have operated under
another rule, which prohibits using impeachment as a mere subter-
fuge to place before the jury otherwise inadmissible evidence.4 If
The traditional rule against impeaching one's own witness is abandoned as
based on false premises. A party does not hold out his witnesses as worthy of
belief, since he rarely has a free choice in selecting them. Denial of the right
leaves the party at the mercy of the witness and the adversary.
3. The rationale of impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement, of course, is to ex-
pose the witness as a person who is capable of making contradictory statements. Techni-
cally, the impeaching party does not claim that either of the two statements is truthful;
impeachment only shows that one of them must be untrue, and that the witness should not
be trusted in all cases to tell the truth. Dean Wigmore describes the proper use of such
impeachment as follows:
[W]e are not asked to believe his prior statement as testimony, and we do not
have to choose between the two (as we do choose in the case of ordinary con-
tradictions by other witnesses). We simply set the two against each other, per-
ceive that both cannot be correct, and immediately conclude that he has erred
in one or the other-but without determining which one. It is the repugnancy
and inconsistency that demonstrates his error, and not the superior credibility
of the prior statement.
3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1018, at 995. Indeed, this rationale supports impeachment
even when neither statement can be believed. Wigmore offers the jury charge of a nine-
teenth-century trial judge:
This reminds me, gentlemen of the jury, of a story I heard many years ago of
old General Scott (not Winfield), who went from Virginia to Kentucky in very
early times, and on his return his friends and neighbors came to see him, and
asked him to give them a description of the country. He said he had never seen
such forests in his life-oak, chestnut and sugar trees reaching up two and
three hundred feet in altitude, and being from fifteen to twenty feet in diame-
ter, and growing so close together that nowhere were these trees more than five
or six feet apart from each other. "Now, General," said they, "tell us something
about the game in that country." "Well," said he, "I saw deer and elk there
whose enormous antlers would measure at least fifteen feet from the tip of one
horn to the tip of the other." "Did they frequent these forest , General?" said
one of his auditors. "Oh yes," said the General. "Then how did they manage to
get through these enormous trees, growing so close together?" "Oh, by h-l,
sir," said the General, "that is their lookout and not mine!"
Id., § 1017, at 994.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he prosecutor
may not use such a statement under the guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of
placing before the jury substantive evidence which is not otherwise admissible.") (quoting
United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982));
United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980);
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our hypothetical prosecutor calls Wilson and Williams and asks
them about what they saw or did on the date of the robbery, ex-
pecting to have to impeach them, is he simply impeaching the
credibility of his own witnesses, as he is allowed to do under Rule
607, or is he using impeachment as a subterfuge, to get the wit-
nesses' otherwise inadmissible statements before the jury, hoping
that the jury will miss the impeachment/-ubstantive evidence
distinction?
Before the adoption of Rule 607, courts usually allowed im-
peachment of one's own witness if the party could show that he
had been surprised by the witness's affirmatively damaging testi-
mony.' Under this surprise and damage test, a prosecutor could
not possibly engage in subterfuge because a showing that the pros-
ecutor knew that the witness would testify inconsistently would
negate any surprise. Courts did not have to worry about the sub-
terfuge issue independently.'
Rule 607 swept away the old concerns about impeaching one's
own witness,7 but it did not eliminate the separate problem of
United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975); Kuhn v. United States, 24 F.2d
910, 913 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 605 (1928).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 1973); Goings v.
United States, 377 F.2d 753, 759 (8th Cir. 1967), appeal after remand, 393 F.2d 884 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966).
6. If a party is not allowed to impeach his own witness, little need exists for a rule
preventing the party from using impeachment of his own witness as a subterfuge. Courts did
allow impeachment under the voucher rule if the party could show surprise and damage, but
they did not use the surprise and damage requirement independently to prevent subterfuge.
But see Graham, Examination of A Party's Own Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 54 TEx. L. REv. 917 (1976). Professor Graham argues that use of the "surprise and
damage" test to determine whether to allow impeachment of one's own witness has indepen-
dent justification, apart from its value in justifying impeachment. Specifically, he argues
that courts developed the surprise and damage test to keep juries from considering im-
peachment evidence substantively. Id. at 977. As such, the test serves the same purpose as
the rule against subterfuge: keeping otherwise inadmissible evidence from the jury.
7. Besides the rule's basic theoretical justification (i.e., that a party generally presents his
witnesses as being worthy of belief), other concerns existed as well. The voucher rule pre-
vented a party from using character evidence to coerce a witness into testifying in the
party's favor under the theory that "the power to impeach involves the power to destroy."
Ladd, supra note 1, at 80. Dean Wigmore described this policy as follows:
If it were permissible, and therefore common, to impeach the character of one's
witness whose testimony had been disappointing, no witness would care to risk
the abuse of his character which might then be launched at him by the disap-
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preventing impeachment as subterfuge. Rule 801(d) (1) (A) contin-
ues to categorize unsworn prior inconsistent statements as hearsay,
and thus restricts their substantive use;8 therefore, the courts now
face the dilemma of accepting a party's impeachment of his own
witness while at the same time guarding against subterfuge.
Both Mrs. Wilson's and Mr. Williams's prior statements that
they saw or spoke to Davis on the day of the robbery are hearsay
and thus inadmissible as substantive evidence.' As the Federal
Rules of Evidence were initially phrased, however, the statements
would not have posed a hearsay problem because the Rules did not
pointed party. This fear of the possible consequences would operate subjec-
tively to prevent a repentant witness from recanting a previously falsified
story, and would more or less affect every witness who knew that the party
calling him expected him to tell a particular story.
3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 899, at 664.
Of course, as Wigmore noted, this fear affects every witness who is subject to impeach-
ment. Opponents of the voucher rule, therefore, failed to accept this justification for the
rule, because repentant witnesses were already subject to impeachment by the adversary.
Advocates of the rule, however, viewed the chance of impeachment by one's own party as
a different matter, and argued that it should be prohibited. As Wigmore explained, "[O]f
this sort of abuse from the opposite side the witness is even now sufficiently afraid; were he
liable to it from either side indiscriminately, the terrors of the witness-box would be
doubled." Id.
The scope of this Note is limited to impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement. It
does not discuss impeachment with evidence of a witness's character. The coercion justifica-
tion for the voucher rule is not addressed here; however, the mere use of his prior inconsis-
tent statement is unlikely to "coerce" a witness. As Dean Ladd pointed out:
[T]he consequences of impeachment by this method could not be serious.
There is nothing disgraceful about being mistaken and the witness would have
the opportunity of correcting and explaining his former statement. /
.There is hardly a slight possibility of coercion by the use of prior incon-
sistent statements; surely not enough to make application of the control theory
plausible.
Ladd, supra note 1, at 84-85. In any case, Rule 607 clearly covers any impeachment,
whether by prior inconsistent statement or by character.
8. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
9. Neither statement falls within the hearsay exception of Fan. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
Each statement is inconsistent with trial testimony, but neither was made at a trial, grand
jury proceeding, or deposition. They are not excluded from the definition of hearsay, there-
fore, and are inadmissible under FED. R. Evm. 802.
Even though the statements are hearsay, they may be admissible under Rule 803. Because
this Note is concerned with the circumstances under which a party should not use "other-
wise inadmissible" evidence for impeachment, the Note assumes that neither of these state-
ments would qualify under any of the Rule 803 provisions. But see infra note 94 and ac-
companying text.
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classify prior inconsistent statements as hearsay.10 Under the origi-
nal proposed Rules, therefore, Rule 607 would not have caused any
subterfuge problem because an unsworn prior statement would not
have been "otherwise inadmissible."
The changes in the definition of hearsay in Rule 801, however,
did not go as far as the drafters of Rule 607 had contemplated.
The drafters of Rule 607 apparently believed that all prior incon-
sistent statements would be admissible as substantive evidence,
thus eliminating any hearsay problem.11 As eventually adopted,
-however, Rule 801(d) (1) (A) included unsworn prior inconsistent
statements as hearsay, thus rendering them inadmissible as sub-
stantive evidence. Because an unsworn prior inconsistent state-
ment can be used for purposes of impeachment, but not as sub-
stantive evidence, the old rule against subterfuge took on new
vitality. With some prior inconsistent statements remaining "oth-
erwise inadmissible," the operation of Rule 607 in conjunction with
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) creates real dangers of subterfuge.
Many commentators have argued that a prior inconsistent state-
ment should be admissible as substantive evidence under certain
circumstances. 12 Strong arguments certainly exist for giving un-
sworn prior inconsistent statements substantive weight. As Dean
Ladd has argued, if the declarant is in court and subject to cross-
10. See, e.g., Blakey, Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 3, 7-9 (1975); Graham, supra note 6, at 961-62.
11. See FED. R. EVD. 607 advisory committee note: "If the impeachment is by a prior
statement, it is free from hearsay dangers and is excluded from the category of hearsay
under Rule 801(d)(1)." This language supports the argument that Congress originally in-
tended to allow all prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. When Congress
finally adopted Rule 801(d)(1)(A), however, the rule did not exclude all prior inconsistent
statements from the definition of hearsay. See Graham, Employing Inconsistent State-
ments for Impeachment and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed
Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (A), 613, and 607, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1565, 1575-82 (1977) [hereinafter Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements]; Graham,
The Relationship Among Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A), and 403: A Reply to
Weinstein's Evidence, 55 Tax. L. REv. 573, 574 (1977) [hereinafter Graham, The Relation-
ship]; Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness With A Prior Inconsistent Statement: Ohio
and Federal Rules 607 and Hearsay Considerations, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 100, 113 (1981).
12. See, e.g., 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 1018; Bein, Prior Inconsistent Statements:
The Hearsay Rule, 801(d)(1)(A) and 803(24), 26 UCLA L. Rav. 967, 1035 (1979); Ladd,
supra note 1, at 87.
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examination concerning his statement, perhaps no hearsay objec-
tion should arise to its admission. s
The question of the substantive value of an unsworn statement,
however, is different from the question of using impeachment as a
subterfuge in the hope that a jury will consider the statement's
substance. The resolution of the second question cannot hinge
upon the old answer to the first. Congress has made the legislative
judgment that unsworn prior inconsistent statements are inadmis-
sible as substantive evidence. 14 Arguments about the substantive
value of such statements, therefore, have no validity in the discus-
sion of when courts should allow impeachment with such state-
ments. Arguing that a prosecutor should be able to engage in sub-
terfuge because the evidence he wants to present to the jury should
be admissible anyway completely ignores the fact that Congress
has, for whatever reasons, rendered unsworn prior inconsistent
statements inadmissible for substantive use. The arguments
against allowing impeachment with such statements because of a
fear of their substantive use therefore retain much of their
vitality.15
Of course, completely excluding such statements solely because
of the fear of their substantive use is not an acceptable solution.
13. See Ladd, supra note 1, at 87.
14. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) includes unsworn prior inconsistent statements in the defi-
nition of hearsay; cf. United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1977)
("Congress has now spoken to the issue and Congress, not the court, has the final say. There
is, after all, a difference between a prior statement obtained from a witness by the police in
the course of a criminal investigation, and testimony given under oath in a formal proceed-
ing.") (citation omitted).
15. One of the original justifications for the voucher rule was the fear that the jury would
take the impeaching evidence for its substantive value. In their criticism of the voucher rule,
many commentators flatly responded to that fear by stating that such evidence should be
admissible anyway. The logic is irrefutable; if the evidence should be admissible anyway,
impeachment with such evidence should raise no objection based on a fear of substantive
use. See, e.g., 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1018 at 996; Ladd, supra note 1, at 87.
These commentators succeeded; Rule 607 did away with the voucher rule and now allows
impeachment. With the concurrent adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), however, Congress has
stated explicitly that courts may not give unsworn prior inconsistent statements substantive
value. The old arguments against the voucher rule no longer apply to the subterfuge ques-
tion: To say that those statements should have substantive value fails to answer the objec-
tion to their use for impeachment in the hope that the jury will use them for their substan-
tive value. Congress has said they are not to be so used; it does not answer the question to
say that they should be.
1987]
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Evidence often is admitted with instructions that it be used only
for a limited purpose.1" Indeed, impeachment by the adversary car-
ries the same danger of substantive use, yet courts allow it without
fear of such use.17
To state the response more accurately, however, impeachment
by the adversary is admitted with some fear of substantive use, but
a tolerable fear of such use. Courts consistently take the risk that
juries will disregard their limiting instructions, but in some cases
we regard such a risk as a tolerable one.
When should we accept that risk? What is it about those in-
stances where the evidence is admitted that convinces us that the
risk is tolerable? An honest appraisal of the trial procedure as a
whole should demonstrate that the answer does not lie in the evi-
dence itself, but in the sum of circumstances under which it is
presented. Such is the basic justification for the rule against sub-
terfuge: The rule is not a judgment about the nature of the evi-
dence as such, but a judgment about the fundamental fairness of
the trial procedure. Courts agree that when the prosecutor uses im-
peachment as a subterfuge to place otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence before the jury, those circumstances require exclusion of the
evidence. The issue is neither the evidence's reliability" nor its
16. See FED. R. EvID. 105. The rule provides that
[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
jury accordingly.
17. Ladd, supra note 1, at 87. As Ladd points out:
The identical chance of misuse of impeaching statements exists where the wit-
ness has damaged the proponent as where the witness has damaged the oppo-
nent. Yet in the latter case prior inconsistent statements are universally admit-
ted without fear that the triers may accept the impeaching statements as
substantive evidence.
Id.
18. Even when a statement has very good indicators of reliability, courts nevertheless
properly refuse to allow the unsworn statement as substantive evidence. See, e.g., United
States v. Livingston, 661 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In that case, the witness denied or failed
to recall conversations mentioned in a prior statement which the witness had made to a
postal inspector. The defendant argued that the statement should not have been considered
substantively because the witness did not make the statement at a hearing, trial, deposition,
or other proceeding as required by FED. 1R Evm. 801(d)(1)(A). (The statement was, however,
made under oath.) 661 F.2d at 241-42. The court agreed:
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hearsay nature, but instead the prosecutor's manipulation of the
trial procedure. Courts properly do not tolerate such manipulation.
The essential inquiry thus focuses on defining the trial circum-
stances under which a court should find that such manipulation is
actually occurring. Once the question is formed in this manner, in-
quiries into questions such as the nature of the witness's testimony
or the reliability of the impeaching statement obviously fade in sig-
nificance. Those questions are questions of evidentiary admission.
The subterfuge question, on the other hand, is a separate is-
sue-one of fairness in the trial procedure.
Proposals for limiting subterfuge should be evaluated on two ba-
sic criteria. First, of course, one must judge any proposal by its
effectiveness. Any rule designed to stop impermissible subterfuge,
however, must co-exist with Rule 607's clear language sanctioning
proper impeachment. In this context, an effective rule should not
only prohibit impermissible subterfuge, but also should allow
proper impeachment. Second, any rule of law should be closely
linked to the essential problem it tries to solve. Because the es-
sence of the rule against subterfuge is manipulation of the trial
procedure, one should evaluate proposals for implementing the
rule primarily in terms of their principled connection to remedying
that problem.
Courts and commentators have taken three main approaches to
the problem. The first, offered by Professor Graham, is to reimpose
the pre-Rule 607 surprise and damage requirement that restricted
impeachment of one's own witness. The second, advocated by
Judge Weinstein, is to apply a standard Rule 403 analysis under
Here, a postal inspector went to Ms. Hester's residence, asked her questions,
took notes, wrote a statement based on her responses, asked her to read a type-
written copy and to make any necessary changes, and then obtained her signa-
ture swearing to the accuracy of the statement. We do not think that these
circumstances satisfy the Rule's requirement of a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding.
Id. at 242 (footnotes omitted). Although the statement had significant indicators of reliabil-
ity, the court still classified it as hearsay under FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1)(A) and refused to
admit it.
Of course, the court could have admitted the statement if the statement met the reliabil-
ity requirements of FED. R. EVD. 803(24). In that instance, however, the court's analysis
should have focused openly on substantive admissibility, rather than on reliability as it af-
fects the right to impeach. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. The subterfuge in-
quiry is not related to the question of reliability, but to the fairness of the trial procedure.
1987]
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which the prior inconsistent statement would be admissible for im-
peachment unless its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its
probative value. The courts have not adopted either view but in-
stead have followed a third approach. They state that a party may
not call a witness for the primary purpose of impeaching him. This
Note analyzes these suggestions and concludes that none offers the
best solution. The Note then suggests a possible alternative, under
which a prosecutor could not impeach his own witness with a prior
inconsistent statement when he apparently has questioned the wit-
ness about the subject matter of the prior statement for the pri-
mary purpose of impeachment. 19
19. Admission of an unsworn prior inconsistent statement does not raise any confronta-
tion clause issue. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the defendant was convicted of
a drug violation on the strength of a witness's prior inconsistent statement. The witness
made the statement at the defendant's preliminary hearing, during which time defendant's
counsel subjected the witness to extensive cross-examination. Id. at 151. At the trial, the
witness's testimony was read into the record as substantive evidence. A police officer also
testified that the witness made similar incriminating statements prior to the preliminary
hearing. Id. at 151-52. The California Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction,
holding that use of the prior inconsistent statement violated the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to confrontation. People v. Green, 70 Cal.2d 654, -, P.2d 422, 479, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 782, 789 (1969), reu'd, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted at the outset that its task
was not to choose among various alternatives in hearsay law, but only to consider whether a
state violated a defendant's confrontation rights when it decides to allow prior inconsistent
statements for their substantive value. Green, 399 U.S. at 155. The Court stated that the
admission of an out-of-court statement does not violate the defendant's sixth amendment
right to actually "confront" an accuser as long as the declarant is testifying at the trial. The
Court said that "[v]iewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude that the Con-
frontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long
as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examina-
tion." Id. at 158.
The Court acknowledged that the prior inconsistent statement standing alone may be
susceptible to some of the dangers against which the sixth amendment is supposed to guard.
When the witness is subjected to cross-examination at trial, however, those dangers do not
rise to a constitutional level: "[T]he inability to cross-examine the witness at the time he
made his prior statement cannot easily be shown to be of crucial significance as long as the
defendant is assured of full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial." Id. at 159.
The Court also found no constitutional problem with such belated cross-examination,
adopting Judge Hand's statement in DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.
1925), that if the jury decides on a statement's truthfulness by looking at the witness's pre-
sent demeanor instead of his demeanor at the time he made the prior statement, the jury is
still using demeanor as a factor. The Court said that it
discount[ed] as a constitutional matter the fact that the jury at trial is fore-
closed from viewing the declarant's demeanor when he first made his out-of-
304
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PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Surprise and Affirmative Damage
Under the pre-1975 voucher rule, a party could not impeach his
own witness unless the party was surprised by the witness's affirm-
court statement. The witness who now relates a different story about the
events in question must necessarily assume a position as to the truth value of
his prior statement, thus giving the jury a chance to observe and evaluate his
demeanor as he either disavows or qualifies his earlier statement. The jury is
alerted by the inconsistency in the stories, and its attention is sharply focused
on determining either that one of the stories reflects the truth or that the wit-
ness who has apparently lied once, is simply too lacking in credibility to war-
rant its believing either story. The defendant's confrontation rights are not vio-
lated, even though some demeanor evidence that would have been relevant in
resolving this credibility issue is forever lost.
Green, 399 U.S. at 160 (emphasis added).
Although Justice White wrote his majority opinion in Green in language that touched on
some of the points of the evidentiary discussion concerning the substantive use of a prior
statement, he reiterated the Court's role as that of deciding the constitutional question:
"[W]hether admission of the statement would have violated federal evidentiary rules against
hearsay... is, as emphasized earlier in this opinion, a wholly separate question." Id. at 163
n.15 (citations omitted).
The Court also addressed the admission of the witness's unsworn out-of-court statement
to the police officer. The Court found no constitutional distinction between the statement
made at the preliminary hearing and the one made under less formal circumstances to the
officer, again, as long as the declarant was subject to cross-examination concerning the state-.
ment. The Court noted that
[t]he subsequent opportunity for cross-examination at trial with respect to
both present and past versions of the event, is adequate to make equally ad-
missible, as far as the Confrontation Clause is concerned, both the casual, off-
hand remark to a stranger, and the carefully recorded testimony at a prior
hearing.
Id. at 168.
As an evidentiary matter, and for the purposes of this Note, of course, a major distinction
exists between the statement made at the preliminary hearing and the unsworn statement
to the officer. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(A) excludes the former from the category of hearsay,
thereby allowing a court to admit it for its truth. The latter is classified as hearsay, and,
therefore, is not admissible as substantive evidence.
In Green, however, the Court emphasized that the crucial point in the constitutional
analysis of the admission of any out-of-court statement against a criminal defendant is
whether the declarant is subject to effective cross-examination at trial. If he is, the confron-
tation clause is not implicated by admission of the witness's prior inconsistent statement,
even for its substantive value. See also United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 959 (6th Cir.
1981); 3A J. WIMORE, supra note 1, at § 1018.
This Note examines the right of a prosecutor to introduce hearsay evidence. In Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the Court considered hearsay restrictions on defendants.
In that case, the defendant tried to prove his innocence by introducing three witnesses, each
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atively damaging testimony.2" The surprise and damage rule pro-
vided a logical escape from the voucher rule,21 but it served an-
other function as well: it prevented a party from calling a witness
for the purpose of impeaching him in the hope that the jury would
give substantive weight to the prior inconsistent statement. Before
the adoption of Rule 607, the surprise and damage requirement
adequately screened impermissible prosecutorial action. Subter-
fuge was impossible because if the prosecutor knew before trial
that the witness would testify inconsistently, that knowledge would
negate any surprise and, therefore, exclude any impeachment. Be-
cause of this operation of the surprise and damage requirement,
courts did not have to consider the subterfuge issue independent of
the right to impeach one's own witness. The adoption of Rule 607,
however, means that courts now must consider the subterfuge issue
by itself.
Because of this danger of subterfuge, Professor Graham argues
that courts should interpret Rule 607 to require re-imposition of
the surprise and damage rule when a party wishes to impeach his
own witness with a prior inconsistent statement.22 According to
of whom proposed to testify to separate statements of another person in which that person
incriminated himself in the crime. Mississippi's hearsay rule barred these statements. Id. at
292.
The Court held that where the prior statements "bore persuasive assurances of
truthworthiness," a technical adherence to the hearsay rule could not deny the defendant
his right to put on evidence in his own defense. Id. at 302. "Few rights are more fundamen-
tal than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense .... In these circum-
stances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are impli-
cated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice." Id.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 1973); Goings v.
United States, 377 F.2d 753, 759 (8th Cir. 1967), appeal after remand, 393 F.2d 884 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966).
21. If a witness surprised the calling party and affirmatively damaged his case, one could
hardly argue that the party vouched for that witness's credibility. In the years before the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, therefore, most courts allowed impeachment of
one's own witness where the party could prove surprise and affirmative damage. See, e.g.,
United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 1973); Goings v. United States, 377
F.2d 753, 759 (8th Cir. 1967), appeal after remand, 393 F.2d 884 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 883 (1968); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 921 (1966).
22. Graham, supra note 6, at 978. Graham argues that "courts should interpret rule 607
as continuing to require surprise and damage before the government is permitted to im-
peach its own witness by prior inconsistent statements that are neither within rule
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Graham, Rule 607's broad grant of power to impeach must be read
in conjunction with the expressions of congressional purpose evi-
dent in the changes made in Rule 801(d)(1)(A)2 In passing Rule
801(d)(1)(A), Congress made a legislative judgment that unsworn
prior inconsistent statements are inherently less reliable than other
prior inconsistent statements. Under those circumstances, he ar-
gues, assuming that Congress, in passing Rule 607, intended to
make those inherently unreliable statements freely admissible as
impeachment evidence is illogical.24 If the purpose of continuing to
classify unsworn prior inconsistent statements as hearsay is to
keep the jury from using those statements as substantive evidence,
then such statements should not be used for impeachment, be-
cause of the danger that the jury will use them as substantive evi-
dence despite a limiting instruction.2 5
Graham's argument raises a basic question: If an unsworn prior
inconsistent statement is inherently unreliable, why should it be
allowed under any circumstances, surprise or not? As stated ear-
lier, Graham, like most commentators, is not establishing a sub-
stantive rule of admissibility. Instead, he merely states a judgment
that the chance of conviction with an unreliable statement out-
weighs the interests of a fair system of orderly justice in circum-
stances in which no surprise or damage occurred. The exception to
the voucher rule, that impeachment should be allowed when the
prosecutor is surprised by the witness's damaging testimony, does
801(d)(1)(A) nor otherwise admissible as substantive evidence." Id. (footnote omitted); see
also Graham, The Relationship, supra note 11, at 575; Graham, Employing Inconsistent
Statements, supra note 11, at 1617.
23. Graham, supra note 6. Professor Graham argues that "[p]ermitting the Government
without limitation to impeach its own witness by introducing prior inconsistent statements
that do not meet the requirements of rule 801(d)(1)(A), designed to ensure reliability, would
promote the very evil Congress sought to avert by amending proposed rule 801(d)(1)(A)."
Id. at 977-78.
24. Id. As Professor Graham concluded:
In considering rule 801(d)(1)(A), Congress expressed its unwillingness to per-
mit the admission of all prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence,
in part because of a concern that juries might convict criminal defendants on
the basis of unreliable prior inconsistent statements. It certainly follows that
Congress did not intend to expand the range of prior inconsistent statements
not falling within rule 801(d)(1)(A), as revised, that are receivable in evidence
for the limited purpose of impeachment.
Id. at 977 (footnotes omitted).
25. Id.
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not judge the relative reliability of the impeaching statement. If
surprise and damage has occurred, the reliability of the prior in-
consistent statement does not change; but the defendant's interests
in that situation are now less important than the prosecution's new
interest in a fair, orderly trial. Thus, the evidence is admitted re-
gardless of its reliability.26
The surprise and damage approach is open to criticism on sev-
eral fronts. First, some ambiguity exists about what constitutes af-
firmative damage.27 Before the adoption of Rule 607, most courts
viewed "affirmative damage" as requiring that the witness's trial
testimony directly exculpate the defendant. A neutral "I don't
know" or "I don't remember" might not be sufficiently damaging
to allow impeachment with the witness's prior statement.2" If the
surprise and damage test for impeachment were re-instituted, how-
ever, the damage requirement could be subjected to some judicial
tinkering. Because any witness who refuses to tell the same story
he told earlier arguably has damaged the state's case, some courts
might adopt a different standard for "affirmative damage."
Second, the surprise and damage test is too mechanical.2" A
tripwire test such as surprise prohibits impeachment without re-
gard for any of the considerations supporting the impeachment of
26. One writer has argued against the surprise and damage approach in part because its
automatic exclusion of evidence rigidly requires the exclusion of prior inconsistent state-
ments that have a high degree of reliability, both as to the certainty of making and accuracy
of reporting. Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness Under Rule 607, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 393,
397 (1979). Such concerns are justified only when arguing that such highly reliable state-
ments should be admissible for their truth. The subterfuge question should hinge on differ-
ent considerations. A prosecutor can engage in subterfuge with a reliable statement just as
easily as he can with an unreliable one; to argue that impeachment should be allowed when
the statement is reliable is in effect to make a subliminal leap into arguing for its substan-
tive admissibility.
Another student writer makes a more honest assessment of the problem in recommending
that surprise and damage be the test for impeachment, but that the hearsay exception of
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) be broadened to include extremely reliable unsworn prior inconsistent
statements. Note, supra note 11, at 118.
27. Cf. Ordover, Surprise! That Damaging Turncoat Witness Is Still With Us: An Anal-
ysis of Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 65, 67
(1976) (describing the difficulty of demonstrating surprise and affirmative damage).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Dunmore, 446 F.2d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1041 (1972); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966).
29. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE V 607101], at 607-18 (1985).
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one's own witness which originally led to the statutory rejection of
the voucher rule. The voucher rule was a blunt instrument prohib-
iting impeachment except under the very limited circumstances of
surprise and affirmative damage. In light of Rule 607's clear lan-
guage generally sanctioning impeachment, courts should not adopt
a test for subterfuge based on the same type of bright-line rule.
The drafters of Rule 607 obviously intended to abandon the an-
cient restrictions that the voucher rule placed on impeachment. Al-
though the courts must guard against subterfuge, they should not
exclude proper impeachment by such a mechanical and hard-to-
meet test as surprise and damage.30
When we consider its effectiveness in limiting subterfuge, the
failings of the surprise and damage approach are even more clear.
If effectiveness depends upon both stopping impermissible subter-
fuge and allowing permissible impeachment the surprise and dam-
age rule obviously falls short in the latter category. For example,
under this rule neither of our two hypothetical witnesses would be
subject to impeachment with the prior statements, because the
prosecution knew in advance that neither would adhere to those
statements. Although the surprise and damage rule obviously
would prevent introduction of those statements as a subterfuge
30. In most cases, a prosecutor will have difficulty meeting the surprise requirement. A
witness need only notify the prosecution before trial that he has changed his story to avoid
impeachment. In these days of extensive pre-trial preparation, witnesses who have changed
their stories are unlikely to "surprise" the prosecution in very many cases. See also Ordover,
supra note 27, at 67 ("The demonstration of surprise and affirmative damage was often
difficult. If the government knew prior to trial that the witness recanted the statement, no
showing of surprise could be made.") (footnote omitted).
A party's right to properly impeach a witness should not hinge on such factors. Cf. United
States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1193 (7th Cir. 1984). In Webster, the defendant urged the
court to adopt Professor Graham's view, which required surprise and damage before the
government could impeach its own witness. Id. Judge Posner declined, posing the following
hypothetical:
Suppose the government called an adverse witness that it thought would give
evidence both helpful and harmful to it, but it also thought that the harmful
aspect could be nullified by introducing the witness's prior inconsistent state-
ment. As there would be no element of surprise, Professor Graham would for-
bid the introduction of the prior statements; yet we are at a loss to understand
why the government should be put to the choice between the Scylla of forgoing
impeachment and the Charybdis of not calling at all a witness from whom it
expects to elicit genuinely helpful evidence.
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under the guise of impeachment, the rule would disallow much le-
gitimate impeachment as well.
Finally, and most importantly, the surprise and damage require-
ment simply bears little direct relation to the goal of restricting the
use of prior inconsistent statements as subterfuge. If surprise and
damage do exist, justifying impeachment of one's own witness is
much easier; however, a prosecutor who calls a witness knowing
that impeachment will be necessary is not necessarily attempting
to engage in subterfuge. Although a court may infer subterfuge
from such knowledge, the relationship between a prosecutor's prior
knowledge that impeachment will be necessary and his actual mo-
tive in calling the witness is certainly less than direct. Justice re-
quires a rule which takes greater account of all the trial circum-
stances. If admissibility hinges on simple surprise to the
prosecutor, the surprise and damage rule bears an insufficient rela-
tionship to the goal it purports to achieve.
Although the surprise and damage requirement prevents subter-
fuge, the rule developed only as an exception to the voucher rule
itself. The surprise and damage rule did not develop indepen-
dently, and Rule 607's abolition of the voucher rule must affect its
justification. The surprise and damage test was developed to allow
impeachment of one's own witness under certain limited circum-
stances. If impeachment is now allowed under more liberal circum-
stances, the independent vitality of the surprise and damage test is
suspect.
Rule 403 Approach
Judge Weinstein rejects the surprise and damage requirement
and argues instead for an application of Rule 403: a balancing of
probative value against prejudicial effect.,1 This analysis presuma-
bly excludes extremely unreliable and incriminating prior inconsis-
31. FED. R Evm. 403 states that
[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Judge Weinstein argues that
[i]nstead of placing so much emphasis on the motive of the profferor, an ap-
proach more consistent with the underlying policy of the federal rules of evi-
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tent statements. The factors determining a statement's probative
value apparently would include assurances that the earlier state-
ment was in fact made, the statement's ambiguity, 2 and the state-
ment's general reliability.33
Reliability may indeed be an efficient measure of probative
value, but in the case of impeaching evidence, the reliability in-
quiry should be limited to assurances that the prior inconsistent
statement was made. It should not depend upon the apparent
truthfulness of the prior inconsistent statement. To argue other-
wise is to assert that the more value a prior inconsistent statement
has as substantive evidence, the more willing courts should be to
allow it for impeachment.3 4 If, however, courts limit the reliability
inquiry to the question of whether the witness actually made the
prior statement, impeachment is allowed for the proper reason: to
attack the credibility of the witness's trial testimony.3 5
Professor Ordover has argued that Rule 403 creates an adequate
barrier to the impermissible use of prior inconsistent statements
dence would be to analyse the problem in terms of Rule 403-is the probative
value of the impeaching evidence outweighed by its prejudicial impact?
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, at 607-17.
32. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, at 607-17.
33. Id. Judge Weinstein applied Rule 403 to the facts of United States v. Morlang, 531
F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975). In his inquiry into the impeaching statement's probative value, he
indicated that courts should consider the statement's reliability:
If this test were applied to the Morlang case, the probative value of the evi-
dence would be quite low. The... witness to whom it was allegedly made had
spent over half his adult life, back to 1941, in prison for convictions which
included grand larceny and breaking and entering, and the statement itself was
extremely ambiguous, and did not relate to any of the facts of the case.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, at 607-17; see also infra notes 34, 54-58 and
accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976). In that case, the court
based its decision on whether to allow impeachment on the impeaching statement's reliabil-
ity. Because the prior inconsistent statement met the requirements of FED. R. EviD. 803(24),
the court allowed impeachment. Id. at 290-91. Judge Weinstein cites Leslie for the argu-
ment that a statement's substantive reliability should become a part of the analysis in de-
termining an impeaching statement's probative value under Rule 403. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 29, at 607-19 to -20.
35. Courts often misapply this reliability analysis to the subterfuge question. They should
not base the subterfuge inquiry on the impeaching statement's reliability. Of course, if the
prior inconsistent statement is reliable enough to be admitted under Rule 803(24), then
courts should admit it as substantive evidence. Courts should state that they are applying
Rule 803(24), however, instead of allowing a prior statement's substantive value to enter
into the subterfuge analysis.
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because the probative value of the prior inconsistent statement is
limited to the question of the witness's credibility."8 Because the
permissible use of the impeaching statement is limited to impeach-
ing witness credibility, its probative value will always be low. On
the other hand, because the prior inconsistent statement probably
will contain damaging statements by the witness or defendant,
prejudice will usually be high.3 7 Under these circumstances, he ar-
gues, Rule 403 usually should bar the evidence.3 8 In addition, al-
though he notes that Rule 607 seemingly eliminates the surprise
and damage requirement, he argues that surprise and damage
should remain a part of the Rule 403 analysis.39 Where the oppos-
ing party can show an absence of surprise, the jury confusion
which automatically results should bar the prior inconsistent
statement.,
Professor Graham has criticized the Rule 403 approach on the
grounds that it is too uncertain and will lead to divergent results
based upon the views of individual judges. 41 In addition, he argues
that the rule will be ineffective, rarely barring impeachment with a
prior inconsistent statement. This criticism has two facets. First,
Graham notes that a proper Rule 403 analysis should consider the
probative value of both the prior inconsistent statement and the
testimony it impeaches.42 Because the probative value of that trial
testimony will usually be very high, the value of impeachment of
that testimony will be high as well. Under those circumstances,
36. Ordover, supra note 27, at 66.
37. Id. at 70.
38. Id. at 72.
39. Id. at 70.
40. Id. at 73-76. Professor Ordover argues that unsworn prior inconsistent statements are
not inherently unreliable, or else the Federal Rules would have excluded them completely.
Id. at 74. Thus, he concludes, the question of allowing impeachment with such statements
should hinge in part on the reliability of the statement. Id.
This conclusion does not state the situation completely and accurately, however. Although
the Federal Rules do not completely exclude unsworn statements, the avenue for their ad-
mission on the basis of their reliability is Rule 803(24). If a prior inconsistent statement
bears substantial guarantees of trustworthiness, perhaps courts should admit it; however,
courts should analyze trustworthiness under Rule 803(24), not under Rule 607. See
also supra notes 34-35.
41. Graham, The Relationship, supra note 11, at 576.
42. Id. at 579.
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Rule 403 rarely would exclude impeachment with the prior
statement.43
Second, Graham argues correctly that the probative value and
prejudicial effect of a prior inconsistent statement will usually vary
directly, thus rarely excluding the statement. If the probative value
of the prior statement is limited to attacking the credibility of the
witness, most prior statements will indeed be very probative of
credibility."4 The more the prior statement varies from the wit-
43. Id. The correlation between the probative value of the witness's testimony and the
probative value of impeachment of that testimony is related closely to the application of the
affirmative damage requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977). In that case, the prosecutor called a witness who
had previously pled guilty to participation in the same crime. The witness, Baker, had made
a previous statement incriminating both the defendant and himself. Id. at 493. On the
stand, Baker said he could not remember identifying the defendant in his statement, that he
could not remember the statement, and, furthermore, that he could not even remember the
robbery. The prosecutor then called the agent to whom Baker had made his previous state-
ment. The statement, which directly inculpated the defendant, was read into evidence in its
entirety. Id. at 494-95.
The court held that the impeachment was permissible. It inquired into the relevancy of
the witness's in-court testimony, phrasing the question in terms close to "affirmative dam-
age." Id. at 496. The court found that when "one of the actual participants" expressed
doubt about the defendant's guilt, the prosecutor was entitled to impeach the witness. The
court recognized that
[i]t would be unfair to permit the use of extrajudicial statements to impeach
testimony extraneous to the issues of the case, particularly if related state-
ments damaging to the defendant are disclosed to the jury in the process.
Courts must be watchful that impeachment is not used as a subterfuge to place
otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury.
Id. at 496-97. In this case, however, because doubt expressed by a confessed participant was
not testimony "extraneous to the issues of the case," impeachment was not being used as a
subterfuge; the prosecutor merely questioned the witness on an important matter in the
case about which he had unique knowledge.
In United States v. Long Soldier, 562 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1977), the court had to decide
only whether the witness's testimony was "inconsistent" with his previous grand jury testi-
mony for the purpose of substantive admissibility under FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A). Com-
menting on the right to impeach one's own witness, however, the court noted that Rule 607
did away with the surprise requirement for impeachment, but stated that "since [the wit-
ness's] testimony was sufficiently harmful to the government's case, impeachment was
proper. . . ." Id. at 605 n.3.
44. For example, consider the situation in which a witness merely denies making an ear-
lier statement. In this Note's hypothetical, for instance, the prosecutor asks, "Did you see
the defendant carry a gun and money into his building on the day of the robbery?" The
witness responds, "No, I did not." If the prosecution is then given the opportunity to prove
through the testimony of the FBI agents that Mrs. Wilson did in fact make such a state-
ment, proof of the prior statement is plainly very probative of the witness's credibility.
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ness's trial testimony, the more probative the statement is on cred-
ibility. On the other hand, most such prior statements assumedly
will also damage the defendant. Thus, the more probative the
statement, the more incriminatory, and hence more prejudicial, it
is. Because Rule 403 requires that evidence be excluded only when
prejudicial effect substantially outweighs probative value, the rule
would rarely exclude impeachment if prejudice and probative value
vary directly.45
The Rule 403 approach is also open to the criticism that trial
judges will give great deference to impeachment in their weighing
process merely because of Rule 607's clear language allowing im-
peachment. When a trial judge conducts his Rule 403 analysis, he
might give great weight to Rule 607 and allow impeachment. In
such a case, Rule 607 itself becomes part of the "probative value"
of any impeaching statement. Because this addition increases over-
all probative value, prejudicial effect will rarely outweigh probative
value so as to exclude impeachment.
Indeed, Professor Graham has suggested that some courts will
conclude that a Rule 403 analysis is not appropriate at all in light
of Rule 607, and will allow impeachment regardless of the state-
ment's prejudicial effect.46 He argues that Rule 403 need not be
applied to all evidence. Where a specific rule speaks to a certain
question of admissibility, one may interpret that rule as com-
pletely controlling the analysis. When the question of impeaching
one's own witness arises, therefore, a judge might conclude that no
Rule 403 analysis is necessary because Rule 607 clearly speaks to
the issue and explicitly sanctions impeachment.47 Some courts
have decided the impeachment question in a manner open to that
interpretation.48
45. Graham, The Relationship, supra note 11, at 579-80.
46. Id. at 581.
47. Id. at 581-82; cf. B. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 9.7(a) at 9-34 n.204
(1985) (claiming that Rule 607 "permits a party to impeach his own witness without qualifi-
cation"); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 17.6(C) (National District Attorneys Ass'n
1977) ("The prosecutor should not be prohibited from impeaching a witness for the state.").
48. See, e.g., United States v. Inendino, 604 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 932 (1979); United States v. Alvarez, 548 F.2d 542, 543 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977). In both
cases, the court used the plain language of Rule 607 to dismiss rather summarily challenges
to impeachment.
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On its face, however, the Rule 403 approach appears to be a bet-
ter method of applying the subterfuge rule. As Professor Ordover
has recognized, when courts make the Rule 403 analysis, they
should limit consideration of a prior inconsistent statement to its
impact on the witness's credibility.49 If courts consistently applied
Rule 403 in that manner, it would screen adequately much imper-
missible subterfuge.
Under the first of the basic criteria for an effective rule, the Rule
403 approach is superior to the surprise and damage requirement
because it does a better job of allowing proper impeachment and
excluding impermissible subterfuge. For example, applying a Rule
403 analysis to our two hypothetical prior inconsistent statements
seems more satisfactory than does applying the surprise and dam-
age test. If we consider only assurances that the statements were in
fact made when analyzing probative value, then both Williams's
and Wilson's statements probably are very probative of credibility.
The witnesses made these statements to FBI agents, who are prob-
ably able to verify and reliably communicate the statements. Be-
cause the trial testimony of both witnesses consisted of simple de-
nials that they made any statements, extrinsic proof that the
witnesses in fact made lengthy statements might be considered
very probative of the witnesses' credibility. In terms of prejudicial
effect, Mrs. Wilson's statement arguably is not very prejudicial; a
mere bystander, not a participant, made the statement. Also, it is
not a claim that the defendant actually did anything illegal. We
might conclude, therefore, that the statement should be admitted
under Rule 403. On the other hand, Mr. Williams's statement
might be considered more prejudicial because it comes from an al-
leged co-participant and more directly links the defendant to ac-
tual criminal activity. As a result, the statement might be excluded
under Rule 403 because of its incriminatory nature. 0
Nevertheless, the Rule 403 approach is still open to criticism. As
previously mentioned, courts might not apply Rule 403 consist-
ently because of differing views about what to consider in the pro-
49. Ordover, supra note 27, at 70.
50. Note that these results are completely opposite from those that probably would occur
if the current "primary purpose" rationale were applied to this case. See infra notes 52-77
and accompanying text.
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bative value/prejudicial effect equation. In that case, the results in
each inquiry would vary dramatically depending upon which fac-
tors courts allowed to enter into the equation. In addition, courts
seem reluctant to rely solely on Rule 403 and rely instead on the
primary purpose rationale.
Most importantly, however, the Rule 403 approach fails the sec-
ond criterion for effectiveness. Like the surprise and damage rule,
it simply fails to place proper emphasis on the prosecution's mo-
tives in calling and questioning the witness. The Rule 403 ap-
.proach bears no principled link to the goals of the rule against sub-
terfuge. In one sense the rule is more effective than the surprise
and and damage rule because it will probably allow more proper
impeachment; however, Rule 403 focuses on the nature of the evi-
dence itself. The essence of the subterfuge rule is the conduct of
the party calling the witness and its effect on the fundamental fair-
ness of the trial procedure. The nature of a piece of evidence some-
times may correlate with the prosecution's conduct, but the rela-
tionship is not necessarily causative or direct.51
Judicial Response
The federal courts have neither retained the surprise and dam-
age test nor completely adopted the Rule 403 approach. The courts
generally have continued to rely on the old pre-Rules language
prohibiting subterfuge5 2 but now they also must give weight to
51. But cf. Fenner, Handling the Turncoat Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 55 NoTRe DAME LAW. 536 (1980). Professor Fenner argues that any inquiry which
focuses on counsel is artificial, because the real goal of the rule against subterfuge is to
protect the opposing party from the danger of substantive use of untrustworthy material.
He states that
the proper object of this rule is to protect a party from some level of prejudice
threatened by untrustworthy material. It is artificial to focus on counsel and
his knowledge as a way of protecting the opposing party. We are not trying to
save counsel's face or to protect his personal record and the rule should not
focus on counsel.
Id. at 539; see also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, at 607-17 (rejecting empha-
sis on the motive of the proferror).
52. See United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he prosecutor may
not use such a statement under the guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of plac-
ing before the jury substantive evidence which is not otherwise admissible.") (quoting
United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982));
United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980);
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Rule 607's clear language allowing impeachment. The result is a
facially attractive rule, but its application allows impeachment
under the wrong circumstances and for the wrong reasons.
The rule against subterfuge existed long before the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under that rule, a party could not
call a witness for the primary purpose of impeaching him with oth-
erwise inadmissible evidence.53 Although doctrinally sound, the
rule is flawed in its application because of the difficulty in deter-
mining the prosecutor's "primary purpose" in calling a witness. As
the case law developed, this weakness was exposed.
United States v. Morlang,54 a pre-Rules case, provides perhaps
the best example of the operation of the rule against subterfuge. In
Morlang, the defendant was accused of conspiracy to commit brib-
ery. The government's witness, Wilmoth, had indicated previously
that his testimony would not implicate Morlang.5 5 On the stand,
Wilmoth denied a conversation with a fellow prison inmate in
which he incriminated Morlang. The prosecutor then called the in-
mate, who testified to Wilmoth's statement, which indeed impli-
cated Morlang. 56
The court reversed Morlang's conviction, stating that "the only
apparent purpose in calling [Wilmoth] was to get before the jury
the alleged statement made to Crist.' '57 The court emphasized that
prior to the trial the witness indicated clearly that his testimony
would not harm the defendant. In addition, the government appar-
ently did not try to attack Wilmoth's story on any point other than
his statement to Crist.55 Under those circumstances, the court held
that the prosecutor had tried to use impeachment as a mere
subterfuge.
United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975); Kuhn v. United States, 24 F.2d
910, 913 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 605 (1928).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1985).
54. 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975).
55. The court noted that "[t]he government freely admits that it was in no way surprised
when Wilmoth's testimony did not implicate Morlang." Id. at 188 n.11.
56. Crist, the inmate, testified that Wilmoth told him, "One of us had to take the rap so
the other one could stay out and take care of the business." Id. at 188 n.11.
57. Id. at 190.
58. The court noted twice that the prosecutor apparently limited his purpose in calling
Wilmoth to eliciting testimony that he had never made an incriminating statement to a
fellow inmate. Id. at 188, 190.
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Morlang was the subterfuge rule's last gasp before the passage of
Rule 607. Even with Rule 607's explicit language allowing impeach-
ment, however, the courts clung to the rule against subterfuge. The
"primary purpose" test continued to develop after the adoption of
the Federal Rules and appears to be binding precedent in all cir-
cuits which have considered the subterfuge question.5 9 The courts'
application of the subterfuge rule, however, demonstrates clearly
that the "primary purpose" test does not fulfill its purported goals.
Under the current application of the primary purpose test, a wit-
ness with little to add to a case cannot be impeached, but a witness
with other connections to the case is subject to impeachment.
These results bear little connection to the fundamental goals of the
rule against subterfuge.
In United States v. Crouch,60 for example, the witness previ-
ously had told an FBI agent that the defendant asked her to "get
rid of the truck" which the defendant had allegedly used in the
robbery. On the stand, the witness denied making the statement.
The prosecutor then called the agent to testify to her statement.6 '
On appeal, the court held that the trial judge should not have al-
lowed the impeachment. Drawing on several pre-Rules cases estab-
lishing the rule against subterfuge, including Morlang, the court
held that the government had impeached its own witness imper-
missibly. The "primary purpose" test was satisfied when the wit-
ness was called to testify only on the limited issue of Crouch's
phone call to the witness. The court had little trouble saying that
the witness had been called as a subterfuge, because "there was
little else of relevance in her testimony. '6 2
Courts have applied the primary purpose rationale in other cases
with similar results. In United States v. Fay,"3 the defendant, who
was on trial for assault, called the victim's mother to testify. The
mother had stated previously that the victim told her that she was
going to the defendant's house and "fight like hell." The defendant
admitted that he knew the mother would deny making the earlier
59. See United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1985).
60. 731 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 778 (1985).
61. Id. at 622. No limiting instruction was asked for or given.
62. Id. at 624.
63. 668 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1981).
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statement, but proposed to impeach her testimony with the prior
inconsistent statement."
The court upheld the trial judge's exclusion of the impeaching
testimony. It applied the "purpose" rule from Morlang and found
that, under the circumstances, it could not say that the defendant
called the mother for any purpose other than impeaching her with
her own prior inconsistent statement. The defense attorney appar-
ently questioned the victim's mother only on the victim's alleged
statement that she was going to "fight like hell." Because the
mother was questioned on that issue only, the court apparently
had no difficulty holding that the defendant's "primary purpose"
in calling the mother was to impeach her. Because the subterfuge
rule prohibits such impeachment, the trial court properly excluded
the testimony6 5
According to this line of cases, courts will not allow an attorney
who calls a witness with little to add to a case to impeach that
witness with a prior inconsistent statement. Under these cases, a
court could rule that the attorney called such a witness for the pri-
mary purpose of impeachment, and that the attorney thereby used
impeachment as an impermissible subterfuge.
This result has a very strong facial appeal. If the prosecutor
knows before trial that a witness called to testify on one or a small
number of issues will not adopt his prior statement, then a court
easily may assume that the prosecutor intended to impeach the
witness to get otherwise inadmissible testimony before the jury. A
full consideration of the primary purpose test, however, requires
an analysis of cases in which courts allowed impeachment.
Courts have allowed impeachment when the only apparent fac-
tual distinction from the Crouch line of cases was that the witness
was involved more closely in the case. Under those circumstances,
courts apparently are simply more comfortable finding that the
prosecutor did not call the witness, who can offer testimony on a
variety of issues, for the "primary purpose" of impeachment.
In United States v. Miller,66 for example, the witness, Crawford,
previously had made a statement to the FBI incriminating the de-
64. Id. at 378-79.
65. Id. at 379; see also Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1979).
66. 664 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982).
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fendant. On the stand, however, he denied the defendant's guilt.
The prosecutor introduced Crawford's prior statement to indicate
to the jury those areas in which the prior statement differed from
his in-court testimony.6 7
One of the most obvious distinctions between Miller and Crouch
was that in Miller the witness was not just a passerby, a next-door
neighbor, or some other person relatively uninvolved in the case.
Crawford was "the hub" of the theft ring for which the defendant
was on trial, and already had testified at the trial of Miller's co-
conspirator. 8 Under those circumstances, Crawford obviously had
a great deal to add to the case. The court was reluctant to say,
therefore, that the prosecutor had called him for the "primary pur-
pose" of impeaching him with his prior statement. The court thus
held the impeachment permissible.69
In United States v. DeLillo, ° the defendant stood accused of
conspiracy to commit fraud and bribery. The impeachment issue
centered around the testimony of two of the defendant's employ-
ees, one of whom implicated the defendant. One employee testified
that DeLillo had stated that he did not care what had to be done
to stop an investigation of his construction work. The other em-
ployee testified to the same conversation, but denied that DeLillo
had made the incriminating statement. The prosecutor then intro-
duced a tape recording of a conversation between the two wit-
nesses in which the second witness confirmed the first's version of
the story.7 1
The defendant objected to the impeachment, basing his objec-
tion on the subterfuge rule. The court affirmed the conviction, not-
ing that the prosecutor did not question the second witness on a
limited issue, but elicited testimony on many issues of importance
to the case. Under those circumstances, the court could not say
that the government called him for the primary purpose of im-
peachment.7 2 The court approached the primary purpose test in
the same way that the court in Miller did: because the prosecutor
67. Id. at 97.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 97-98.
70. 620 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980).
71. Id. at 946.
72. Id. The court stated that
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had questioned the witness on so many issues, the defendant could
not argue reasonably that the prosecutor called the witness with
the "primary aim" of impeaching him with an inadmissible prior
inconsistent statement.
A recent district court case from California provides another ex-
ample of the "primary purpose" rule. In United States v.
Ogorodnikova, s the prosecutor called an alleged participant in the
defendant's espionage activity. The witness, Miller, was an FBI
agent accused of passing a secret "lositive intelligence guide" to
the defendant. The witness had made an earlier statement to some
of his fellow FBI agents incriminating both himself and
Ogorodnikova. He later repudiated that statement and informed
the prosecutor before trial that he would deny passing any secret
documents.74
Citing Crouch and Morlang, the defendant argued that impeach-
ment with the agent's prior statement should not be allowed. She
argued that because he knew that the witness would give testi-
mony inconsistent with his prior statement, the prosecutor was en-
gaging in an impermissible subterfuge by nevertheless calling the
witness and questioning him concerning the statement."
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to exclude the im-
peaching testimony. Under the "primary purpose" rationale, the
court found that the prosecutor had not called the agent for the
primary purpose of impeachment. Because Miller was a co-partici-
pant, he had other testimony to offer as well, including evidence on
his other meetings and contacts with the Ogorodnikovs. His testi-
mony on those issues was important to the government's case, and
[b]eyond doubt, Monahan was not called to the stand by the government as a
subterfuge with the primary aim of getting to the jury a statement impeaching
him. Monahan's corroborating testimony was essential in many areas of the
government's case. Once there, the government had the right to question him,
and to attempt to impeach him. . . about those aspects of his testimony which
conflicted with Gorman's account of the same events.
Id.
73. No. CR 84-972(A)-Kn (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 12, 1984).
74. Memorandum of Defendant at 1, United States v. Ogorodnikova, No. CR 84-972(A)-
Kn (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 12, 1984) (copy on file at William and Mary Law Review office).
75. Id. at 2-8.
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once he took the stand impeachment of any inconsistencies in his
story was permissible.7 6
When we analyze the primary purpose rationale in terms of ef-
fectiveness and doctrinal validity, we see that it is at least a better
alternative than either the surprise and damage test or the Rule
403 approach. The primary purpose test allows much permissible
impeachment and screens some impermissible subterfuge. It also is
linked more directly to the real goals of the rule against subterfuge
and hence is more doctrinally sound than either of the other alter-
natives. By focusing primarily on the purpose of the prosecutor,
rather than on surprise or on the nature of the impeaching state-
ment, the primary purpose rationale places the emphasis of the
subterfuge inquiry where it belongs: on the prosecutor and his ac-
tions as they affect the fairness of the trial procedure.
Despite its advantages over the other two tests, however, courts
should abandon the primary purpose test as currently interpreted.
As the cases show, the inquiry into the prosecutor's intentions is
based chiefly on how much the witness has to say. If a prosecutor
calls the witness to testify on a variety of issues, the courts assume
that the prosecutor's motives in inquiring into an earlier statement
must be pristine and allow impeachment. If a witness has little
connection with the case other than his prior statement, however,
the courts assume that the prosecutor must have ulterior motives
for inquiring into the statement. To hinge a determination of the
prosecutor's "motives" on whether the witness has a lot to say
76. The court stated that
[i]t is quite clear that the Government is not calling Mr. Miller to the stand
merely for the purpose of gaining admission of otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence. The testimony of Mr. Miller is relevant to the proof of accusations that
the Government has brought against the Ogorodnikovs and will certainly be
elicited for this purpose.
Motion for Reconsideration of Court's Ruling re Government's Impeachment of Richard W.
Miller at 11, United States v. Ogorodnikova, No. CR 84-972(A)-Kn (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 12,
1984) (copy on file at William and Mary Law Review office).
The impeachment issue in Ogorodnikova involved the use of Miller's unsworn prior state-
ment to his fellow FBI agents that he had passed secret documents to Ogorodnikova. In an
interesting subsequent development, Miller's own trial for espionage resulted in a mistrial
when two jurors voted against conviction, partly because they did not believe Miller's prior
statement to his fellow agents. One juror told a reporter that Miller "was browbeaten and
swayed by the interrogation. He would have signed anything put in front of him." Painful
Stalemate, TIME, Nov. 18, 1985, at 51, col. 2.
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makes no sense, yet courts seem to consider that very factor when
ruling on impeachment as subterfuge. When courts determine a
prosecutor's "primary purpose" in calling a witness by weighing
how much a witness has to add to the case, they lose the trail
which leads to the ultimate resolution of the subterfuge question.
This problem stems from the language of the test itself. Asking
whether the witness was called for the primary purpose of im-
peachment sets the standard for impermissible subterfuge too
high. Under this test, before a trial judge can exclude impeach-
ment as subterfuge, he must make a determination that the prose-
cutor called a witness for no other apparent purpose than impeach-
ment with his prior inconsistent statement on one issue. If a
witness is able to testify on more than one issue, a trial judge will
hesitate to make such a determination, which could be easily over-
turned on appeal. Thus, impeachment is allowed regardless of the
prosecutor's real motives in impeaching the witness.
This test also has another obvious practical flaw. If the test for
impeachment is whether the witness testifies on more issues than
just his prior inconsistent statement, prosecutors will simply in-
quire into more issues.77 When the defendant protests that the
prosecutor is using impeachment as a subterfuge, the prosecutor
need only point out that he clearly has not called the witness only
for the purpose of impeaching him: he called the witness for his
testimony on the other matters as well. Because the witness testi-
fies on more than one issue, the trial judge allows the impeachment
without any real consideration of the prosecutor's actual motives.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE
By placing its emphasis on the prosecutor, the primary purpose
rationale goes further than other suggested alternatives toward a
proper resolution of the subterfuge question. Unfortunately, that
approach does not go quite far enough. The primary purpose ra-
tionale prevents a prosecutor from calling a witness for the pri-
mary purpose of impeaching him with otherwise inadmissible evi-
77. With such a strategy, of course, relevancy becomes a concern. Under FED. R. Evm.
401, however, any prosecutor should be able to devise a sufficient relevancy hypothesis to
support enough varied questions to meet the "primary purpose" test as it is currently
applied,
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dence. Courts should shift the inquiry slightly, and forbid
impeachment of one's own witness where the witness apparently
was questioned on a certain issue for the primary purpose of
impeachment.
As the primary purpose rationale has developed, the courts focus
on factors that have little or no direct relation to the goal of the
rule against subterfuge. The primary purpose rationale properly
places the emphasis on the prosecutor's conduct, but by inquiring
into the amount of evidence a witness has to add to the case, the
test allows too much impermissible impeachment. The number of
issues upon which the witness will testify is too indirectly related
to the prosecutor's real motives in impeaching a witness to be an
effective measure of impermissible subterfuge. In addition, trial
judges may hesitate to find that a witness was called for the pri-
mary purpose of impeachment. Consequently, the test should be
whether the prosecutor has questioned the witness on a particular
issue for the primary purpose of impeaching the testimony with a
prior inconsistent statement.
If trial judges had more latitude to inquire into reasons for im-
peachment, more courts would deny impermissible impeachment
when they think it is taking place. A rule that does not require
judges to determine a prosecutor's primary purpose in calling a
witness will provide that latitude. Trial judges would be better able
to allow impeachment when proper, and exclude it when improper.
This approach would not only link the determination more closely
to the real goals of the rule against subterfuge but also would be
more practically effective because it allows more permissible im-
peachment and excludes more subterfuge than the primary pur-
pose rationale.
What factors should guide a judge's inquiry into the prosecutor's
motives in questioning a witness? The task is to determine the cir-
cumstances under which the prosecutor is most likely questioning
the witness for the primary purpose of impeachment with a prior
inconsistent statement. A trial is a dynamic set of complex and
interrelated situations. When certain of these factors coalesce dur-
ing a trial, a court reasonably should conclude that the prosecutor
is using impeachment with the hope that the jury will take the
impeaching statement for its substantive value. In those circum-
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stances, courts should be more willing to deny impeachment as im-
permissible subterfuge.
One factor should be the prosecutor's need for the impeaching
statement apart from its value in attacking the witness's credibil-
ity. If the statement damages the defendant and contains informa-
tion that is very important to the prosecutor's case, a court should
conclude that the prosecutor's primary motive in inquiring into the
issue was more likely to be subterfuge. On the other hand, if the
prior inconsistent statement contains evidence that is already
before the jury or otherwise cumulative, then a court could con-
clude reasonably that the prosecutor is motivated less by a desire
to get the prior inconsistent statement before the jury. In such a
case, impeachment would be proper.
Another factor should be the extent to which the witness has
indicated previously that he will contradict his prior statement.
This factor would not operate in the simple way that the former
surprise test worked but instead would vary as the witness more
cogently and consistently stated an intent to tell a different story
on the stand. Under this part of the subterfuge detorm aii on, sur-
prise would operate only as an element of the more broad inquiry
into the prosecutor's motives in questioning a witness "on a limited
issue. As the parties and the court become more certain that the
witness will disavow his prior statement, placing the prior inconsis-
tent statement before the jury appears more likely to be the prose-
cutor's real motive. If, on the other hand, the witness has made
only a few ambiguous statements about his intent to cling to his
prior statement, then impeachment by and examination of his
prior inconsistent statement probably constitutes valid impeach-
ment rather than impermissible subterfuge.
A recent case illustrates how this factor might operate. In
United States v. Hogan,78 the court claimed to be applying the
standard "primary purpose" test and not a test of simple surprise;
however, the decision can only be explained as applying some of
the elements of surprise in a primary purpose rationale context. In
Hogan, the defendants were accused of smuggling drugs into the
country from Mexico. The chief prosecution witness was Carpen-
ter, whom Mexican officials had arrested after he piloted one de-
78. 763 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1985).
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fendant's plane to an alleged rendezvous. At that time, Carpenter
gave statements to Drug Enforcement Administration agents that
implicated both defendants in the smuggling scheme. e Mexican
authorities held Carpenter for 28 months. After his release, the
prosecutor called Carpenter to testify before a federal grand jury.
In his testimony, he refused to implicate the Hogans, and claimed
that his confession to the DEA agents had been coerced and
fabricated. 0 At the Hogans' trial, the prosecution called Carpenter.
At a voir dire examination out of the jury's presence, Carpenter
denied any involvement in the smuggling operation and repeated
his claim that the earlier confession had been coerced. He then re-
peated this testimony before the jury. The defendants cross-ex-
amined, and elicited assertions that the Hogans were not involved
in the scheme. The prosecution then called several DEA agents
and embassy officials, who refuted Carpenter's story of coercion."'
The court reversed the defendants' convictions. It agreed with
the government that Rule 607 generally allows impeachment of
one's own witness, but held that the prosecution had run afoul of
the rule against subterfuge.2 The court emphasized the fact that
Carpenter already had testified twice under oath that he had
fabricated his earlier confession." Under those circumstances, the
court found that the prosecution could not have had any other mo-
tive in calling the witness than to impeach him with the inconsis-
tent confession.
The court applied the primary purpose rationale very differently
than it had been applied previously. The court found the fact that
the witness already had testified inconsistently persuasive. Carpen-
ter's importance in the smuggling operation-a fact which in cases
such as Crouch, DeLillo, and Ogorodnikova was the determining
element-made little difference. The court noted Carpenter's im-
portance as a witness but concluded that impeachment was imper-
79. Id. at 699.
80. Id. at 699-700.
81. Id. at 700-01. The opinion did not clearly state whether the agents actually testified to
Carpenter's earlier statement. The court, however, later referred to the prosecution im-
peaching the witness with his prior inconsistent statement. Id. at 703. The prosecution
probably did introduce evidence of Carpenter's prior statement at that time.
82. Id. at 701-03. Limiting instructions were neither requested nor given. Id. at 702.
83. Id. at 703.
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missible because the prosecution clearly knew what the witness
would say on the stand. 4
To that extent, Hogan is directly inconsistent with cases such as
Crouch and DeLillo, in which the court emphasized how much the
witness had to add to the case. In Hogan, the witness would have
indeed had a great deal to add to the case had he testified consist-
ently with his earlier confession. 5 The court, however, found that
the primary purpose test had been satisfied merely because the
prosecution had definite advance warning of the witness's current
story. The government argued that the court was re-establishing
the surprise requirement, but the court denied it. 86 The court dis-
tinguished the situation of a witness who merely recants an earlier
incriminating statement from Carpenter's situation, in which he
had not only changed his story but told the new version before a
grand jury and in voir dire.8 7 Although no "surprise" would exist in
either case, impeachment would be proper only in the former.
The Hogan approach would be a useful element in the subter-
fuge inquiry. The more consistently the witness maintains that his
trial testimony will be inconsistent with his prior statement, the
less willing a court should be to allow impeachment with that
statement. Instead of treating surprise as a fixed point beyond
which no impeachment is permissible, a court should analyze the
prosecutor's knowledge of the witness's intention to testify incon-
sistently in terms of a spectrum. As the prosecution becomes more
certain that the witness will refuse to adopt his prior statement,
the court should be more inclined to disallow impeachment with
that statement.
In their subterfuge inquiry, courts also should consider the con-
sequences of impeachment on the prosecutor's case. If a prosecutor
84. Id. The court did not lean toward imposing a "surprise" requirement, however. The
court stated explicitly that surprise "is not a necessary prerequisite to impeaching one's own
witness under FRE 607." Id. at 702. Because the witness had already so firmly refuted his
previous statement, however, the court held that the prosecution could have had no other
primary purpose in calling the witness than impeaching him.
85. Carpenter piloted the plane used in the alleged smuggling operation. Mexican author-
ities arrested Carpenter, and he spent more than two years in Mexican jails for his part in
the scheme. Id. at 699. Obviously, he could have offered at least as much to the case as Mr.
Monahan in DeLillo or Mr. Miller in Ogorodnikova.
86. Id. at 702.
87. Id. at 702-03.
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wishes to impeach a witness who has given both helpful and harm-
ful testimony, a court should scrutinize more carefully the prosecu-
tor's request to impeach the witness with a prior inconsistent
statement.
For example, suppose that a witness testifies on five issues. She
helps the prosecutor on four of these issues and hurts him on one.
The prosecutor wishes to impeach her with her prior inconsistent
statement on that one issue. If the general effect of impeachment
would be to ask the jury not to believe the witness on all of the five
issues, a court should question the prosecutor's motives in im-
peaching the witness. If impeachment with a prior inconsistent
statement would carry collateral negative consequences for the
prosecutor, then the court should hesitate to allow such
impeachment.
Many authorities see no theoretical problem with a party placing
a witness on the stand and then asking the jury not to believe cer-
tain portions of that witness's testimony. As Dean Wigmore has
noted, to deny impeachment is in most cases to "suppress a por-
tion of the truth."88 If a party believes that his witness is lying or
otherwise mistaken about one issue, he should be allowed to ex-
pose inaccuracies in the witness's testimony, and impeachment of
the witness's credibility is one of the most effective means of doing
SO.
A conflict exists, however, between Wigmore's position that im-
peachment in general should be allowed in such circumstances,
and the classic view about the role of impeachment with a prior
inconsistent statement.8 9 As already noted, such impeachment is
not designed to convince the jury of the truth or falsity of either of
the two statements; it is limited to showing the jury that the wit-
88. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 904 at 675. As Wigmore observed:'
In most cases, the contradiction will deal with only one item in the whole story
of the witness; and there is no reason why the party should not get the benefit
of the witness' testimony on the remaining points and yet show him mistaken
in this one item; such a course is in no way dishonest, and to forbid it is to
impose a captious and purposeless restriction and to suppress a portion of the
truth.
Id.
89. See supra note 3.
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ness is a person who is capable of telling inconsistent stories on the
same matter, and therefore is less deserving of credibility.
If the proper use of impeachment with a prior inconsistent state-
ment is so limited, one can make a reasonable argument that logi-
cal flaws exist in allowing a witness to testify on several issues but
allowing his impeachment on only one issue with a prior statement.
In doing so a prosecutor would say to the jury, in effect, "Listen to
what my witness has to say on all these issues. Now, see that he is
capable of lying about any of them."90 Wigmore's position makes
much more sense with other forms of impeachment such as testing
memory or perception; however, freely allowing impeachment with
a prior inconsistent statement is logically inconsistent. If impeach-
ment with the witness's prior inconsistent statement would carry
collateral negative consequences for the prosecutor's case, a court
should hesitate to allow such impeachment.
Ironically, this factor would operate in a manner completely op-
posite from the current primary purpose rationale. Under the sug-
gested alternative, the more a witness adds to the prosecutor's
case, the more likely it is that impeachment with a prior inconsis-
tent statement would be improper. If a witness testifies on several
issues, and so impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement
would carry collateral negative consequences for the remainder of
the prosecutor's case, courts might not allow impeachment. Under
the current primary purpose rationale, however, the more a witness
adds to a case, the more likely a court is to sanction
impeachment."1
A comparison of the suggested alternative's operation in a typi-
cal case with that of the current primary purpose rationale reveals
the alternative's superiority. In United States v. Ogorodnikova,9 2
90. Cf. Note, supra note 11, at 115 ("It truly makes no sense to put a witness on the stand
and ask the jury not to believe his testimony; the proponent would be asking the jury to
treat the witness's testimony as a nullity and he would have proved nothing."). But see
Fenner, supra note 51, at 538. Professor Fenner argues that courts should exclude an offer
of impeachment as irrelevant in such a situation: "If counsel asserts the truth of all the
witness' testimony except that regarding 'A' and he knows in advance that he will impeach
the witness' testimony regarding 'A,' then, under that counsel's own theory, the initial in-
quiry into 'A' is not relevant." Id.
91. See supra notes 52-77 and accompanying text.
92. No. CR 84-972(A)-Kn (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 12, 1984); see also supra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text.
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for example, although Miller had testimony to offer on many is-
sues, that probably did not affect the prosecutor's motivation to
inquire into his prior inconsistent statement on the one issue in
question. The prosecutor almost certainly asked Miller about his
earlier statement with the intention of impeaching him if he de-
nied its substance. In that regard, the prosecutor in Ogorodnikova
probably had motivations no different from those of the prosecutor
in United States v. Crouch,93 in which the court disallowed im-
peachment. Under the proposed alternative, which focuses on the
prosecutor's motives in inquiring into a particular issue, the court
probably would not have allowed impeachment in Ogorodnikova.
Because the existence of subterfuge is a function of the individ-
ual prosecutor's motives in each case, courts must have the author-
ity to make individual determinations based on the varying dy-
namics of each case. When applied to our two hypothetical prior
inconsistent statements, the proposed alternative's results depend
not upon the nature of the two statements, nor upon the mechani-
cal elements of surprise and damage, but upon the prosecutor's ac-
tions and the dynamics of the trial.
For example, Mrs. Wilson merely indicated to the prosecutor
that she is not willing to say for sure that it was Davis she saw that
day. She has said that if she is put on the stand, she will tell what
she believes to be the truth: that she is not sure what she saw. In
that case, if she can be cross-examined on that testimony, then in-
troduction of her prior inconsistent statement probably would be
proper impeachment, regardless of the fact that she testifies on no
other issue. If, on the other hand, Mr. Williams clearly, emphati-
cally, and continually indicates that his trial testimony will in no
way implicate Davis in the robbery, then inquiring into his prior
inconsistent statement is probably improper-again, regardless of
how many other issues about which he testifies.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Evidence clearly establish a party's right to
impeach his own witness. The judicial doctrine that prohibits im-
peachment as subterfuge, however, calls into question the extent to
93. United States v. Crouch, 731 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 778
(1985); see also supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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which a party may exercise that right freely when he wishes to im-
peach his own witness with an otherwise inadmissible unsworn
prior inconsistent statement. Courts face the dilemma of having to
comply with Rule 607's clear language sanctioning impeachment
while guarding against impermissible subterfuge.
Courts and commentators have offered several suggestions about
how to deal with this dilemma, but none offer a solution adequate
in terms of both effectiveness and doctrinal validity. The surprise
and damage rule would certainly stop impermissible subterfuge,
but would also cut off much proper impeachment. The Rule 403
approach does a better job of allowing proper impeachment, yet it
also allows too much impermissible subterfuge. The primary pur-
pose rationale in current use by most courts appears to be a better
solution, but its application prevents a proper resolution of the
subterfuge question. Most importantly, none of these suggestions
place the emphasis on the motives of the prosecutor, where it
belongs.
The prosecutor's motives are at the very heart of the subterfuge
problem; a proper solution must recognize that and develop its fo-
cus accordingly. Courts should analyze the subterfuge problem by
asking whether the witness was questioned on the subject matter
of his prior statement for the primary purpose of impeachment
with that statement. Such an approach places the emphasis on the
prosecutor and narrows the inquiry to the specific prior statement
at issue.
In a subterfuge determination, courts should consider such fac-
tors as the prosecutor's need for the substance of the prior state-
ment, the extent to which the witness has demonstrated a clear
intent to tell a different story on the stand, and the collateral nega-
tive consequences of impeachment with the prior inconsistent
statement. Because the presence of subterfuge depends upon the
vagaries of differing prosecutors, witnesses, and other trial circum-
stances, judges must have the freedom to weigh these various fac-
tors as they see fit. If, after a full inquiry into the prosecutor's mo-
tives in questioning a witness on a certain issue, the court
concludes that the witness was questioned for the purpose of im-
peachment with an unsworn prior inconsistent statement, the
court should exclude such impeachment as subterfuge.
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A more strict application of the rule against subterfuge will not
deprive a party of the valid use of all unsworn statements in every
case. The suggested rule still would allow inquiry into the prior
inconsistent statement's reliability, but that inquiry now would
take place in a more principled context. Instead of using the state-
ment's reliability to determine whether the prosecutor properly
impeaches his witness, the parties could argue and the court could
decide whether the prior inconsistent statement is reliable enough
to be admitted as substantive evidence under Rule 803(24)."4 If a
prior inconsistent statement is extremely reliable, perhaps courts
should admit it; however, that inquiry should be distinct from the
prosecutor's motives in impeaching a witness. If a prosecutor
wants to get a prior inconsistent statement before the jury, courts
should decide the reliability issue under Rule 803(24) rather than
allow the statement's reliability to enter into the subterfuge
analysis.
Other options exist as well. One option is to amend Rule
801(d) (1) (A) to allow for substantive admissibility of all prior in-
consistent statements. 5 Another option is simply to abandon the
rule against subterfuge, and allow parties to impeach witnesses
freely, even when done with the hope of the jury taking the im-
peaching evidence for its substantive value. This proposal, how-
ever, would require abandoning one of the foundations of our trial
procedure: the notion that courts should not convict people on the
basis of unsworn testimony."8
The question of how to treat unsworn statements of course in-
volves compelling considerations on both sides. In any case, a
strong argument exists for admitting impeaching evidence. If a
trial is supposed to determine the truth of the issue, courts gener-
ally should allow a party to bring that truth to the jury as best he
94. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
95. See supra note 12; see also Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements, supra note
11, at 1589; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARv. L. REv. 177, 192 (1948); Note, supra note 11, at 118.
96. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153-54 (1945) ("So to hold would allow men to be
convicted on unsworn testimony of witnesses-a practice which runs counter to the notions
of fairness on which our legal system is founded.") (citations omitted); see also P. RoTH-
STEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, at 185 (Nov. 1984) (stating that while impeachment of
one's own witness may be helpful, "it must be considered in light of the judicial system's
notions of fairness.") (discussing United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975)).
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can. That would include permitting impeachment of a witness
whom the party suspects is lying on the stand. As Dean Wigmore
noted, "[t]he exclusion of the evidence would be unjust ... in de-
priving the party of the opportunity of exhibiting the
truth ....
This argument's foundation, however, conflicts with other basic
assumptions about the trial process. In effect, Wigmore argues that
the search for truth is important enough to accept the risk of the
jury using the statement substantively. This argument assumes,
however, that the party is introducing the statement as a part of
the search for truth. When that is not the case-when the party is
merely introducing the prior inconsistent statement to get it before
the jury in the hope that they will use it as substantive evidence,
the "search for truth" rationale is no longer valid. Under those cir-
cumstances, courts should not allow the prosecution to impeach
because no "search for truth" exists to outweigh the fear of sub-
stantive use by the jury.
If courts continue to apply the rule against subterfuge, they
must analyze the problem in terms of its essential character. A
proper solution would require courts to examine the prosecutor's
motives in questioning and impeaching a witness. Implicit in such
an examination is the requirement that courts have the freedom to
conduct that inquiry adequately. The problem is not one of evi-
dentiary admission, and thus does not turn solely on evidence-
based elements such as reliability, prejudice, or probative value.
The question is one of the fundamental fairness of the trial proce-
dure, and the prosecutor's actions as they affect it. Courts should
conduct the subterfuge inquiry accordingly.
Don Johnsen
97. 3A J. WiGMORE, supra note 1, § 903 at 672. Dean Wigmore continued:
The only real danger that is to be apprehended [with impeachment] is that the
contradictory statement may be taken by the jury as substantive testimony in
the place of the statement on the stand; but this, though involving the hearsay
rule, is not a serious enough disadvantage to outweigh the above considera-
tions, and can be guarded against by proper instructions.
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